American Power in the 21st Century, Essential Lessons from History

American power has been a defining force in global geopolitics since the beginning of the 20^th century. However, since the beginning of the 21^st century, America’s primacy in global geopolitics has been challenged by China, and other forces, and the current global landscape presents new challenges and dynamics that need to be understood in the context of America's current global geopolitical position and its potential future trajectories.

History reveals that the rise and fall of all great empires follows a predictable trajectory – rapid expansion, a peak, and then a gradual or swift decline depending on factors such as military overextension, economic troubles, and emerging rivals – and this is true for America too. Despite its unparalelled military capabilities, economic power, intellectual property and cultural influence, America faces challenges from rising inequality at home, an electorate increasingly polarised by national populism, fraying international alliances through its handling of two major current wars, and the rise of China as an economic rival.

Navigating these challenges would require America to reaffirm and reassert the values that can lead the world, including its own commitment to liberal democracy, inclusive growth and stability; and before the end of the year, America’s electorate, discontented and plagued by highly effective sources of minsinformation, will decide in the presidential election the path that America takes. The lessons from the fall of past great powers seem more critical than ever for America at this juncture, given that historical patterns would suggest an inevitable decline.

This month’s Sign of the Times examines the pivotal point that the world and America stand at today, and the defining challenges of a transition that could see power slip away from America, or potentially back in its favour.

A World Facing Violent Transition: Challenges for American Power

The world is currently undergoing a profound transformation, marked by a series of major disruptions and crises. While poor countries have witnessed lower growth in the last several years, and borne the brunt of the pandemic and economic hardships, and seen structural poverty increase, and border and territorial conflicts remain unaddressed, the issues of middle income and rich countries have risen too, with rising inequalities within these countries, large populations stuck in middle income traps, and increasing civil dissatisfaction and discontent that have created a volatile global environments¹. Populists have capitalised on these issues, stoking divisions while offering no practical solutions². The failure to address these and other longstanding problems through national and international agencies has led to national unrest and violent international conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza conflict, which risk escalating further.

In addition to conflicts rising by 40% since 2020, populations across the world have and are facing energy pricing shocks, deglobalisation, environmental degradation, economic shocks, political fragmentation, rising income inequality, and technology-driven dislocations, making for a polycrisis³. The lack of progress on major global issues is evident in the significant achievement gaps for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)⁴ and other metrics, despite the apparent availability of sufficient resources to achieve progress measured by the SDGs and other key metrics ⁵ This period is reminiscent of historical transitions between great powers and empires, which were marked by violence, radicalisation and instability⁶, and this suggests that, like those, if the current transition is to an illiberal world order, it could also lead to increased violent conflict between illiberal and liberal forces within and across borders and a world level struggle for power⁷ making it impossible to achieve the SDGs. Currently, America’s role, as the superpower, in this transition is a critical one.

In many ways America stands alongside the Roman, British and Ottoman Empires, as a Great Power in history. In other ways, it contrasts with them given that following its intial conquest and settlement of Native American lands it has dominated most of the world without the traditional imperial model of subjugating and militarily occupying their lands; its means of domination were included trade, multinational corporations, investments, and military coercion⁸. Importantly, other Great Powers as they faced a decisive decline offers important lessons for American power, demonstrating how internal divisions and external failures can herald imperial decline, which has often been swift and, in the absence of rare instances of reinvention, tends to be final. Such falls, were accompanied by the rise of rivals, economic pressures, and overextension which accelerated their eventual collapse⁹. America faces similar challenges today, with China waiting in the wings and various regional powers aligning with it across the world.

The Rise of American Power and Its Potential Decline

The 20^th Century saw the rise of American power and the emergence of a unipolar world order, propelled by America’s victories in two World Wars, the fall of European colonies around the world, its leadership in technological innovation, and resulting global economic dominance. The United States emerged from World War II as the world's leading economic and military power to take over from an overstretched and tired British Empire. America’s global leadership in the second half of the century, embodied in the Liberal World Order¹⁰, saw the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), all headquartered in America, with significant funding from America, and influenced by American post-war liberal ideals, further solidifying its global leadership. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, American power became unipolar.

This period of unipolar hegemony is now being challenged, with calls for a multipolar world order¹¹. The rise of China in particular represents a significant challenge to American power. China's growing economic and military capabilities, coupled with strategic initiatives like the Belt and Road, a string of investments across the world, its alternatives to the World Bank and IMF such as the AIIB and NDB, and increasing funding of UN agencies signal a potential shift in global power dynamics. However, the intersection of American and Chinese interests in various domains - from trade, technology and climate - indicates a complex future of interdependency and rivalry¹².

The accelerated trade conflict with China initiated by the Trump administration highlighted the economic tensions between the two nations and resulted in inflation in America from rising prices of Chinese imports that had subsidised American working class living standards, particularly during the Covid pandemic¹³.China's assertive foreign policy, including its actions in the South China Sea and its influence in Africa and Latin America,¹⁴contrasts with America's more isolationist tendencies in that period¹⁵. This rivalry reflects a broader pattern of power transition, reminiscent of past shifts such as the rise of Germany challenging British dominance in the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries¹⁶.

America's pre-eminence has been multifactorial, and includes an unmatched military capability, with its expenditure constituting nearly 40% of the world's total defence spending in 2023 ¹⁷, which is more than the next nine countries combined. Its economy leads with over a quarter of the world's GDP ¹⁸, and its capital markets represent over 50% of global market capitalisation ¹⁹. With 10% of the world's arable land, it is a significant player in global food production²⁰, and it accounts for 8% of world trade exports²¹. Additionally, it leads in intellectual property development, producing almost 30% of the world's published scientific papers²². The United States continues to lead in technological innovation, with companies like Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta and Microsoft (collectively known as ‘Big Tech’) at the forefront of global advancements. Moreover, America's cultural influence through Hollywood, music, and education still holds considerable sway internationally. So, despite the challenges, America's military and economic strength, and soft power, remain significant.

Lessons for America from the Fall of Great Powers in History

The rise and fall of great powers²³ follows a consistent pattern²⁴ offering critical insights for American power's future trajectory. Although it is essentially a parabola showing empires rise, peak, and inevitably decline, with this pattern evolving through pre-industrial, industrial, and information ages, (Table 1), analysis reveals three distinct forms. The form of the pattern for industrial empires – probably most relevant to America’s historic position – is one of empires that were larger, faced more rivals, fell rapidly, and were shorter-lived than others, and their size was correlated with economic scale. The patterns provide a framework to project the trajectories to determine the shape of America's future power.²⁵

Applying the mathematics of these patterns to the US, taking the pivotal starting point as 1898 with the Spanish-American War²⁶, and the turning point as 2001²⁷, marked by America's relative economic decline in terms of global economic share, China's entry into the World Trade Organisation, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, which led to it prosecuting costly wars and diverting attention from its domestic issues and core rivals. These events underscore the 20^th Century as the "American Century" and the 21^st as the century of change.

Applying the average trajectories of past empires to American power yields three potential end dates, marking when America's relative geopolitical influence, measured by its economic might, could revert to its starting level in 1898 (Table 2):

1. 2032, based on the patterns of Industrial Age empires, which is most relevant.
2. 2067, according to the trends of the six largest empires, which is also relevant.
3. 2122, following the average curve of the 30 la rgest empires in history, which is less relevant.

These scenarios suggest three trajectories for US power in the 21^st century, of which the first two, based on recent or large empires, seem the most relevant and signal American dominance could extend to around 2050. Note that this is mathematical modelling, not an oracle, of course.

However, history shows that power declines to a pattern. And while the exact shape of America’s decline and the end of its status as a great power could vary, history suggests a decline, with the most likely critical point being around the middle of this century (Table 2). The lessons from previous falls of empires suggest the following key lessons for America:

1. Ability to Set the Rules of Engagement. Great Power tends to vanish well before the end of the curve and happens when the power can no longer set the ‘rules of engagement’ for others. This may be because of the loss of moral authority, willingness or effectiveness of actions, or the rise of another power or coalition. For America this point arrives when China or a coalition of rivals determine critical matters in the world, which some estimates place as early as 2035²⁸.
2. Overextension and Resource Allocation. Great Powers most often decline due to the overextension of their resources and military capabilities, and a declining focus on the home front²⁹. America’s lesson would be to avoid the pitfalls of spreading its military and economic resources too thinly across multiple fronts, and select its battles carefully.
3. Economic and Financial Stability and Growth. Economic troubles have precipitated the fall of many empires³⁰. Ensuring that the underlying drivers for innovation, economic and financial stability, and robust economic growth, alongside a powerful currency, are in place is crucial for maintaining American power and its continued global influence³¹.
4. Technological Innovation and Industrial Leadership. Finding and exploiting key technologies and dominance in key industries has historically underpinned Great Powers and lagging it has often precipitated their fall³². For America, this would imply the criticality of continuing to lead in scientific and technological innovation, and its application in industrial development.
5. Political Unity and Governance. Internal political strife and administrative inefficiency can weaken even the strongest empires³³ and stymie the ability of its leaders to take decisive actions. America would need strong, effective governance and political unity to sustain its leadership based on this important lessons from others before it.³⁴
6. Adaptation to Changing Global Dynamics, Managing the Centre and the Periphery. Greaet Powers falitered when they failed to balance attention between the centre where power is administered from versus periphery regions (internal) ³⁵and states (external) issues ³⁶ and adapt to changing global dynamics including the rise of new powers and falls of old ones ³⁷. Ameican is challenged by the power struggle between the centre and its domestic states which threatens disunity, as well as its need to manage relations with foreign spheres of influence. In parallel, shifts in global power dynamics, particularly in the rise of China, Russia as it strives to maintain its Soviet era influence and security, with India rising as a potentially cirtical ally, while sustaining the EU and the UK as historic power blocs.
7. Building and Maintaining Alliances. Strong international alliances have been a cornerstone of great empires in history and this is no different for American power if it is to preserve its power and avoid a precipitous decline³⁸. American exceptionalism, isolationalism and transactionalism would make it successful in the short term but strategically damaged when countering global challenges, which so often require collective global action.
8. Addressing Social Inequalities. Rising social and economic inequalities can lead to internal discontent and instability and strengthening internal cohesion is critical to maintaining power³⁹. America would need to address these issues by providing both social and economic mobility, and security, and investing in its working and middle classes to build social cohesion, and progression.
9. Sustainable Development and Environmental Stewardship. Environmental degradation and unsustainable practices have contributed to the decline of past empires⁴⁰. The climate crisis presents existential risks to economies if left unchecked, and lessons of history suggest America must lead in sustainable development and environmental stewardship to maintain its relevance, particularly at this point where climate is widely held to be an existential risk⁴¹, and where current behaviours suggest the world is on a dangerous climate trajectory⁴².
10. Cultural Influence and Soft Power. Cultural influence is a core feature of Great Powers in history, attracting and retaining talent from across the world, renewing its power ⁴³. This has been a significant aspect of American power from Hollywood, to its sporting prowess, to its world class education system which is open to the world. Preserving and promoting American cultural values and soft power is an essential ingredient in its power assets.
11. Effective Use of Military Power. Military power should be used judiciously and strategically to counter the growing threats that an empire in decline inevitably encounters ^x44.Avoiding unnecessary conflicts and focusing on strategic interests, keeping far-flung parts of the empire in check, and avoiding being drawn into wars that do not benefit its power equation with others is an important factor in maintaining America’s global leadership.
12. Innovating for the Future. Empires succeed and failed based on their discovery and exploitation of disruptive technologies⁴⁵. Continuous American innovation in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing is crucial for staying ahead of global competitors and sustaining economic and military superiority, areas where it currently leads, but where China has taken second place on the back of large-scale spending in many of these fields.

Key Determinants of Nature of Future American Power

The next presidential election in the US will answer the question of the character and nature of America. The determinants of American power and its nature has multiple dimensions including how that power is projected, whether it is a force for stability or tyranny, its core values, how it manages politics at home, its use of coalitions to augment its power, the division of its power between the centre and the periphery, the effectiveness of the system of enterprise that underpins and extends its power, the superiority of its technology and particularly relevant at thos junctire, how that supports its transformation for the next era in the world’s development.

Power Projection

While there is much debate about whether America is an empire (implying a colonial model) or a great power in some post colonial sense, the fact that it exercises its power with some key imperial characteristics in common with other great powers is less questioned⁴⁶. In either case, America faces diametrically opposing forces; calls for it to be embroiled in other’s wars and conflicts, and resistance to exerting its influence in other’s affairs. Two major regional wars in the last three years, both which have drawn in America indirectly thus far, have demonstrated that despite its multi-layered hard and soft power, either majorities or large minorities of the world have started to vote against America’s position ⁴⁶.

For example, Russia’s war in Ukraine saw 52 countries, including India and China, vote against or abstain, rather than support the US position on Russia ⁴⁷. The Israel war in Gaza saw 120 countries, including several large European allies, vote for a humanitarian truce⁴⁸, and the US used its Security Council veto 12 times since February 2020 in relation to the Israel-Palentinian conflict⁴⁹, including as recently as April 2024 to veto ceasefires and the State of Palestine’s full membership to the UN⁵⁰, effectively stopping the will of the rest of the world, thereby prevailing, but losing world support.

Such unpopular divergences from collective interests are testimonies to American power, creating fissures that are difficult to heal and have historically augured the decline of power.

Promoting Global Stability, Avoiding Tyranny

The transition from America as a saviour of European democracies and the international community from aggressors through two world wars, and its emergence as the sole superpower from the Cold War against the U.S.S.R., changed quickly to blindsided vulnerability in the September 11th 2001 attack on America, dangerously flawed in 2008 as its banks caused the collapse of the global financial system and drove economies around the world to seek World Bank rescue, which not much later evidenced as coercive, transactional and divisive in its engagement with international allies in matters related to NATO and Brexit leading up to 2020, culminating in it being unable to lead its allies or rivals in UN voting on the two wars to 2024, with its primary ally in the Middle East, Israel, accused of genocide at the International Criminal Court, and America implicated in that. The turn of events undermined confidence around the world in America’s leadership, particularly in the Global South⁵¹.Such declines in power have in history witnessed tyranny⁵²(or degenerate and moribund societies⁵³) in the absence of a fundamental re-adjustment.

However, America's role in promoting global stability and driving multilateral coordination and progress is the counter-weight to or drag on an otherwise declining trajectory, whch history would suggest can be delayed or accelerated but not halted without transformation. In today’s scenario, this implies active leadership of multilateral institutions, pre-empting, and failing that, driving conflict resolution, and addressing critical global challenges such as climate change, development and pandemics. Given the resolution of current global issues requires a functioning world order that is liberal and inclusive, based on the UN principles of human rights and the advancement of sustainable development, America's renewal of multilateral institutions and its support for global initiatives provide the alternative to tyranny for American Power, and would see it lead in creating and advancing inclusive, secure, and sustainable progress.

National Populism and Its Implications

National populism, with its emphasis on exceptionalism, isolationism, nativism, protectionism, and xenophobia, which are not only behavioural features but are also core values, poses a significant threat to the international liberal order that America leads⁵⁴. With its clear objective of overthrowing the current state of American democracy, it undermines America at home and abroad. To counter this, America would first need to win that battle at home by repudiating national populism in its next election, and then reaffirm its commitment to shared liberal democratic values, and its long-term commitment to ensuring that the principles of individual rights, rule of law, and open societies are upheld.

Throughout much of the West, National Populists have been promising voters that they can reverse the wrongs of the world by somehow stopping the future by reverting to a fictitious past⁵⁵. Their policies aim to halt the growing flows of people, technology and clean energy across the world They promise to bring back old-fashioned societies, with manufacturing jobs and oil and gas guzzling lives. They assert that somehow, they can make their nations great (again) by going back to the past. However, the evidence shows that this era is long past, and that any reversals will only be at the margins, and to the detriment of many, if not most, people⁵⁵.

Uniting Americans and Reducing Civil Divisions

History’s great instances of extreme inequality have led to revolutions, in modern times in France (1789-1799). Russia (1917-1923), and China (1927-1949), accompanied by unparalleled bloodshed and counter-prevailing extremes in terms of political, eoncomic and social systems; 94 million people are estimated to have been killed by killed by Communist regimes since 1917⁵⁶ Economic inequality poses a threat to social cohesion and acts as a force to undermine the credibility of any state, including liberal democracies, making people within and outside question whether it is indeed a system that works for most people, or only a few. Policies that promote inclusive growth, improve access to education and healthcare, and address systemic inequities are therefore essential ingredients of stability; ensuring that the benefits of economic progress are widely shared reduces social discontent and strengthens the foundations of democracy and a market economy⁵⁷.

A level of hopelessness has set in within developed economies given their liberal governments have failed to solve the issues facing the mass public⁵⁸. This has led to radical voting patterns in favour of far-right National Populists, who are ideologically inclined to embrace isolationism, xenophobia, and in the case of former great powers, exceptionalism, and have proven adept at dividing their populations along lines of race, ethnicity, citizenship, and gender (and almost anything),⁵⁹ and while they have not offered any practical solutions to the problems, they provide an emotional rallying call that appeals to large segments of populations⁶⁰. The greatest 21^st Century symbol perhaps of the failure to solve civil divisions and issues saw the rise of National Populism in the US in 2016, and violent insurrection into Congress in 2020.

Quadrilateral Powers and Democratic Alliances

The rise of China as an economically successful authoritarian regime, and one which has thus far had no international wars, challenges the narrative of democracy as a pre-requisite for economic success or peace, notwithstanding questions on human rights. India’s rise offers the potential blueprint for poor countries to rise as democracies. However, in an international system where capital can be translated into power, China has successfully built trading alliances and footholds across the world. This poses a formidable challenge to America and other major democratic allies since they have all suffered relative economic declines while China has been rising. National Populism in America also fractured alignment with its allies based on values. America’s ability to form a strong coalition of democratic allies is a clear determinant of the shape of the curve of nature American power as depictied in the mapping of the trajectory of American Power (Table 2). Strengthening alliances and building a multilateral bloc of the US, the European Union and India creates a coalition of four nations which already together have primary positions in global trade, industrial value, arable land, military power, and population size, and to which other democracies can coalesce, and this creates a formidable bloc that provides sufficient multi-dimensional sources of power to be the leading geopolitical bloc of the 21^st Century⁶¹. This involves not only military alliances but also economic and technological partnerships. If such an alliance can be effective, it could see China’s position as leader would be shortlived if at all⁶².

However, America may of course choose not to build a coalition that shares power under its leadership. Indeed, the changes wrought by the seismic technological and information era changes underway usher in a future defined by sustainability, artificial intelligence, and a new geopolitical landscape which are being resisted by National Populists. Their vision of America goes back more than a century to one that prioritises its national borders and rethinks American democracy in initiatives such as Project 2025⁶³, eschewing Great Power leadership in favour of using its economic and military assets for transactional purposes, while carving up the world between regional powers⁶⁴. However, as history shows, such vaccums are filled by others, and America’s withdrawal would effectively vacate the apex position for China and other coalitions to compete for.

The Power Centre and the Periphery

Alongside overexpansion, economic troubles, and military defeats, the decline of Great Powers is also driven by fundamental internal and transborder power dynamics. Firstly, central to an empire’s stability is the relationship between its core - the imperial centre - and its periphery⁶⁵. This relationship is inherently unstable, as the extraction of resources, labour, and power from the periphery often leads to economic hardship, social unrest, and political discontent in outlying regions. If mismanaged, these tensions can trigger political crises that demand resources to be deployed; the Britsh Empire’s reliance on provincial resources strained relations, leading to revolts and weakened London’s control⁶⁶. Secondly, transborder relationships and small powers play a critical role in sustainaing or undermining Great Powers and can draw them into great wars⁶⁷. China’s initial cooperation with the Mongols ultimately led to its subjugation under the Yuan Dynasty⁶⁸. Similarly, European empires struggled to maintain their colonies during and following World War II, hastening the dissolution of their empires⁶⁹.

Today, the United States faces similar challenges, both internally and externally. Internally, the relationship between the federal government and the states has become a significant battleground. The ongoing struggle over states' rights versus federal authority creates tensions that, if unresolved, could shift power dynamics back to pre-Civil War levels, potentially weakening the unity of the nation. Externally, America struggles to manage relationships with both small and large allies; Israel’s relationship with Palestine regardless of the merits of each side’s cause strains its diplomatic resources, makes it look ineffective, and calls into queston its power. Similarly, with Saudi Arabia as an important regional power and supplier of energy has challenged America’s commitment to its values and this has required both to adapt and reconcile. America’s ability to manage these internal and external tensions call on the full spectrum of its hard and soft power, and has important global security implications.

System of Enterprise and Economic Superiority

History’s Great Powers built systems of enterprise that stretched across the world, with Rome’s roads carrying its trade and Britain’s roads to sea-routes following suit, backed by military security, rules and taxes. The American system of enterprise – encompassing consumerism, producerism, capitalism, technologism and strong laws, regulatory frameworks and institutions – has outperformed all others in history, evidenced by the scale of its global market dominance. Transnational corporations have been central to economic activity and global influence, with American Big tech leading in innovation and market capitalization, and American companies dominating the list of most valuable companies across virtually every major sector⁷⁰. Sustaining American leadership requires leveraging corporate power and fostering a business and innovation conducive environment, which America has done well.

Since the early modern period, enterprises have been the main drivers of economic activity. Modern businesses, integral to capitalism, contribute 72% of GDP across OECD countries⁷¹, fueling economic growth through jobs, investments, profits, taxes, and trade. Historically, global dominance has been linked to leadership in key industries and technologies, resulting in the rise of global corporate leaders that strengthen their nations’ geopolitical positions. However, this system has also created dangerous level os rising income inequality. In a strange twist of events, America’s system of enterprise in the age of AI and social media allows for the distribution and magnification of greviance and unrest without requiring the key issue to be solved, famously called ‘culture wars’⁷², creating a fatal vulnerability when at some point it is undone by reality.

Technological Leadership and the Information Era

Technology has provided states with the power to generate economic value, political capital, and pursue global dominance, making it a critical weapon for Great Powers. Leading in disruptive technologies (steel, gunpowder, steam engines) shaped geopolitical orders (Roman, Ottoman, and British Empires, respectively)⁷³. Today, in an increasingly multi-polar world, technological rivalry is central to great power competition, particularly between the U.S. and China. The EU, India, and regional powers such as Russia, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and the UK also recognize technology as a key pillar of security and influence but are much further behind. America dominates in deploying capital – mainly private sector capital - across 18 of 19 core technologies, including AI, big data, quantum computing and the Internet of Things, leading globally in patent applications due to its vast technology market and homegrown industry leaders⁷⁴. However, China's huge public spend and scaled domestic market has also enabled it to be well positioned to lead in certain key technologies, including e-mobility, drones, EVs and renenwables, the the key to the transition of energy in the face of climate change⁷⁵.

Given the integration of digital technology across various sectors is accelerating, this is ending the dominance of the physical world and allowing for foreign rivals, large and small, to disrupt politics, society and economics across borders using cyber technologies, a field in which China has built formidable strengths.⁷⁶.

While the U.S. is best positioned to lead the Information Age due to its global dominance in key geopolitical assets and core technologies, rising public debt makes it increasingly reliant on private capital, capitalists and particularly technocapitalists with increasingly political agendas⁷⁷ and a divided political system for for funding government⁷⁸. The transition to the information era provides the opportunity for America to slow down its relative decline. Given this is one of three era shifts alongside the Agricultural Era and Industiral Era, it will take the world into unchartered territory providing the opportunity for America to renew its power and create a successor Information Age America that subsumes the industrial one.

In forming geoplotical power policy, these lessons are indicative of the considerations required, and its limitations and future directions require further analysis and investigation⁷⁹.

Conclusion: Sustaining American Power Requires Renewal for Relevance to Another Time of Global Crisis

America stands at a crucial juncture where historical patterns suggest it could face a decline similar to that of other seemingly unconquerable empires with valuable assets. It can respond as it did in past crises, acting as a savior, or it could establish a 21st-century form of tyranny, enabled by its military, capital markets, and technology. To lead as a first among equals, America must share the benefits of its assets, especially its system of enterprise. National Populism, with its focus on fear, hate, and conflict, is ill-suited for effective leadership, whether as a savior or a tyrant. History shows that tyranny has always been overcome, and democracy—spread across the world following two world wars in which America played a pivotal role—has been the enduring answer. If America fails to champion a civilization based on peace, prosperity, and freedom, it risks being supplanted by a new power, as history suggests.

To avoid a rapid decline, America must offer the world something superior to its rivals, which means reaffirming its commitment to liberal democracy, building strong international alliances, investing in technological innovation, addressing economic inequality, and promoting global stability. America’s future as a great power hinges on its ability to remain relevant during global crises and lead in navigating the resulting challenges and opportunities. Lessons from the fall of past powers highlight the importance of sustaining leadership through positive actions.

A transactional approach would erode trust and diminish America's unique role in shaping a secure, prosperous, and free world. Internal conflicts, if left unresolved, could fatally weaken its position, as history has shown with other fallen powers. Overcoming this requires American leaders and citizens to uphold values that resonate globally, representing the positive aspects of American power. The next election seems a critical juncture in the story of American power. The world is entering a new era of the Information Age, offering the potential for unprecedented global prosperity. The key question is whether America will lead this transition and share its benefits with the world.

As major regional conflicts spiral out of control, drawing in the rest of the world, the nation that leads the transition and resolves these conflicts will emerge as the next great power. For America to maintain its power, it must be the one that lead this transition, demonstrating that its leadership is both moral and effective. This means that the values of peace, prosperity, and freedom, delivering inclusive and superior progress, must remain central to American power.

The Leader: Endnotes

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2. Institute for Global Change. (2024, January 11). Divisiveness or delivery: Populism and the primacy of policy responsiveness. Institute for Global Change. https://www.institute.global/insights/politics-and-governance/divisiveness-or-delivery-populism-and-the-primacy-of-policy-responsiveness

3. Güney, I., & Kurnaz, M (2023). The global polycrisis: The causal mechanisms of crisis entanglement. Global Sustainability, 6, Article e23. https://doi.org/10.1017/sus.2023.16 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. (2023). Impact report 2023.https://acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2023-Impact-Report-Final-July-17.pdf

4. Achs, J., Lafortune, G., & Fuller, G. (2024). The SDGs and the UN Summit of the Future. Sustainable Development Report 2024. Dublin University Press. https://s3.amazonaws.com/sustainabledevelopment.report/2024/sustainable-development-report-2024.pdf

5. Force for Good (2024, January). Technology as a Force for Good. Technology Driving the Transition to a Superior Future. https://www.forcegood.org/report-2024

6. Schäfer, M., & Stadelmann, D. (2015). Political economy of environmental policy: A review. Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 17(2), 226-246. https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2015-2-226

7. Chivvis, C. S. (2011). Emerging powers and the international system. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegie-production-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/static/files/Chivvis_Emerging-Powers_11-1.pdf

8. Harman, S. (2001). American power and the empire of capitalist democracy. Review of International Studies, 27(2), 191–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210501008087;Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). American power and the empire of capitalist democracy. Review of International Studies, 27(5), 191–212. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210501008087

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79. Limitations and future directions. In examining current and historic power systems, structures, characteristics, dynamics and projections, there are a vast array of potential limitations to consider. Such analysis necessarily draws out comparators that provide food for thought rather than definitive guidelines. Hence, in forming geopolitical power policy, the lesson provided in this paper can only be indicative of the considerations required in forming strategy. The presented analysis of American power has many limitations of course, including its reliance on the accuracy of historical records of dates and events, the use of traditional metrics of power which may not fully capture the complexities of the period. Also, historic environments may not translate well to contemporary global dynamics. The models used to predict the decline of American power are based on historical patterns and records of dates and key events too. These might not hold well in the face of the unprecedented technological and geopolitical shifts of today, such as the digital revolution and the rise of multipolarity. Additionally, the focus on military, economic, and cultural power may overlook contemporary forms of influence, such as social media. The analysis also depends on current trends and data, which might not accurately predict future changes in political, economic, or technological landscapes. To address these limitations, future research should include diverse perspectives, particularly from various participants in the international power structure. Additionally, more consideration can be given to the role of disruptions such as wars, technologies, national and international governance models, to examine the scenarios for America's evolving influence in an increasingly unpredictable world.